Re: Enough misinformation about IAEA already Eli
I don't remember this full court press from the IAEA in the 1990s regarding Iran. What I do remember is that after the People's Mujahadin released satellite photos of Natanz, the Iranians eventually submitted in theory to the spot inspections of the additional protocol, which of course they never really allowed. At no point did the IAEA independently before late 2002 warn publicly at least that Iran had a secret program in violation of the NPT, and this is what I was talking about.
In regards to North Korea, I was referring to the uranium enrichment activities that--depending on the account and what year the account is rendered--the Norkors either copped to in 2002 or were sufficiently ambiguous about (neither confirm nor deny) to create the crisis that led Pyongyang to kick out the observers and cameras from Yongbyon in 2003. As it turns out traces of uranium were found on equipment at the end of last year.
In both cases the IAEA system failed to warn of or stop serious undeclared activities. You might say reasonably that the IAEA was in no position to catch such cheating. I even grant that. My point is that the system is compromised and our collective security is endangered when we include rogues like Iran and North Korea into agreements like the NPT. These recent examples I think disprove the working assumptions of the previous decades, that getting rogues to sign agreements like the NPT will neutralize the threat.