Originally Posted by Ocean
According to the above, Eliezer is not a "substance" dualist, but a "property" dualist. To be more precise he appears to say that since matter and non-matter are all computable properties at a quantum level (not sure this is the right way to describe it, sorry), they are separable and transferable. Abandoning one's body to enter a machine recreation is similar to abandoning one's body of a second ago onto one's body of now. It all seems conceivable at an extremely abstract level. But it's certainly impossible for the layperson to make a distinction between this kind of thinking and fantasy. I think that Massimo keeps trying to ground Eliezer's ideas onto something that is more tangible and supported by evidence, but he has been unable to so far (I'm at minute 51).
Eliezer is not a property dualist. He believes that all properties of your mind are ultimately properties of your brain or of what your brain is doing. This means that he is not a property dualist.
However, those properties could be had by other chunks of matter besides your brain, just as is the case with many other properties of your brain, such as its color or weight. If another chunk of matter had enough of the *right properties*, it would be, for all intents and purposes as much *you* as was your original brain. (Color and weight are almost certainly not among the "right properties".)
What Eliezer and Massimo disagreed about was, what are the "right properties"? Massimo believes that the properties could very well include a certain kind of historical continuity and a certain very specific kind of biological substrate. Eliezer expects that these are not among the "right properties".