Your post is not particularly responsive to mine.
In any case, your proposition is, in fact, objectionable to readers of the book. (How could it not be? It’s loaded with value-presumptive terms (e.g., “commonplace,” “hijack,” etc.), which again leads you into circularity (i.e., presupposing the very thing you’re trying to prove).)
Again, your comments do not take the trouble to untangle the definitional from the existential. Your operative assumption that Goldberg is primarily concerned with lexicography is misguided. He is concerned with the organic links between ideas, thinkers, institutions and movements. These are phenomena anterior to lexicography.
A cumulative (or preponderance) argument is not really amenable to sampling. It’s volume is, in part, its argument. Presumably, a critic who dismisses a particular example of overlap between liberalism and fascism as incidental has in mind a hypothetical threshold beyond which the sheer volume of such instances render further dismissal problematic. (A critic lacking such a threshold is not discoursing in good faith. He is beyond persuading in principle.)