Go Back   Bloggingheads Community > Diavlog comments
FAQ Members List Calendar Search Today's Posts Mark Forums Read

Notices

Diavlog comments Post comments about particular diavlogs here.
(Users cannot create new threads.)

Reply
 
Thread Tools Display Modes
  #1  
Old 07-27-2008, 09:04 AM
Bloggingheads Bloggingheads is offline
BhTV staff
 
Join Date: Nov 2007
Posts: 1,936
Default Sentimental Mood Edition

Reply With Quote
  #2  
Old 07-27-2008, 11:56 AM
fedorovingtonboop fedorovingtonboop is offline
 
Join Date: Dec 2007
Posts: 216
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

I think Jesse might want to read "The Blank Slate" by Stephen Pinker and Mike Gazzaniga's new one "Human" because those pose a pretty pretty damn strong argument in favor of universal innate morality.
Reply With Quote
  #3  
Old 07-27-2008, 04:12 PM
Happy Hominid Happy Hominid is offline
 
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: West Los Angeles, CA
Posts: 147
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Hi Fed. As a huge Pinker fan and, in particular, The Blank Slate, I'm not convinced that Pinker would totally disagree with what Jesse seems to be saying. It's more of a mechanistic difference in how they see things.

So, to correct myself, Pinker would perhaps disagree but what is being disagreed with is not a diametrically opposed way of viewing morality, but a case of whether there is a genetically imposed moral area in the brain or whether it's just another part of our genetically imposed learning capacity and that, de facto, moral intuitions will arise or the society will either never get off the ground or it will fall flat in a short time.

I don't think either of them has enough empirical evidence at this point and they would probably both agree to that fact.
__________________
It's another day in paradise...
Reply With Quote
  #4  
Old 07-27-2008, 11:39 PM
fedorovingtonboop fedorovingtonboop is offline
 
Join Date: Dec 2007
Posts: 216
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Quote:
Originally Posted by Happy Hominid View Post
Hi Fed. As a huge Pinker fan and, in particular, The Blank Slate, I'm not convinced that Pinker would totally disagree with what Jesse seems to be saying. It's more of a mechanistic difference in how they see things. .......

I don't think either of them has enough empirical evidence at this point and they would probably both agree to that fact.
yeah, you could be right but it's a really complicated yet, like you implied, vague discussion because research is just getting started in this type of thing. i'd have to re-read both books and then listen again (which i'm way too lazy to do) but Jesse just struck me as being pretty "squishy" in certain areas.
however, the first thing that came to mind was Pinker's list of universal human traits in the footnotes of his book. picturing the hundreds of examples makes the other side seem pretty weak to me. if anyone hasn't tried "Human" - it's freakin' sick - definitely one of the better (pop) neuroscience books i've read and it's dense as can be. not an easy read to be sure.
Reply With Quote
  #5  
Old 07-28-2008, 01:33 AM
Happy Hominid Happy Hominid is offline
 
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: West Los Angeles, CA
Posts: 147
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

I'll look into it. Thanks for the heads up.
__________________
It's another day in paradise...
Reply With Quote
  #6  
Old 07-27-2008, 12:39 PM
threep threep is offline
 
Join Date: Oct 2006
Posts: 81
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Chapel Hill what what
Reply With Quote
  #7  
Old 07-27-2008, 02:51 PM
AlphaMoose AlphaMoose is offline
 
Join Date: Jul 2008
Posts: 1
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Watching it now, but those first couple of minutes rank among the most akward things I've ever seen.
Reply With Quote
  #8  
Old 07-27-2008, 04:14 PM
Happy Hominid Happy Hominid is offline
 
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: West Los Angeles, CA
Posts: 147
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Yeah. Will stopped doing that as you will see. It was bizarre. It was like he couldn't hear Jesse, yet he didn't say he couldn't hear him.
__________________
It's another day in paradise...
Reply With Quote
  #9  
Old 07-27-2008, 04:32 PM
jimM47 jimM47 is offline
 
Join Date: Apr 2007
Posts: 459
Default Political Correctness

Will and Jesse talk about Political Correctness, and defend it, presumably from conservative critics. I think, though, that, when they characterize Political Correctness as consisting of, and only consisting of, the stigmatization of certain norms of behavior, they give short shrift to the position of their opponents.

What opponents of Political Correctness find most grating about it is the extent to which it forecloses the possibility of actual factual discussion. It creates the possibility that a statement may be an accurate description of reality, but that because that reality is inconvenient for advocates of certain norms, it becomes something incorrect to inquire about — it is literally incorrect politically, but not factually. I think critics of Political Correctness chafe most at the extent to which it is the use of social stigma to enforce a noble lie.

As an example, I am reminded of Lawrence Summers, who was compelled to resign as the president of Harvard after suggesting that disparities between men and women working in the sciences might be caused, in part, by innate differences. That statement is factually correct: we have not seen evidence ruling out that hypothesis, and even have reason to believe it is true in some small measure. Regardless, the utterance of the statement was deemed to be socially harmful to the goal of increased gender equity, so it was condemned as being politically incorrect.

All this is not to say that the noble lie aspect of political correctness is morally indefensible. One can certainly posit scenarios in which members of an in-group might be in some small way innately superior to members of an out-group, but in which widespread knowledge of this disparity would lead to discriminatory behavior drastically out of proportion with the actual difference, leading to bad outcomes for all concerned. Even if we value the search for truth above all else, we might still choose a temporary noble lie if the bad outcomes caused by knowledge of the innate in-group-out-group difference would retard the process of knowledge-seeking.

Still, my libertarian impulses cannot help but rise to the surface here, since the idea of the noble lie enforced by social stigmatization by the majority strikes me as being dangerously paternalistic, and prone to a slippery slope that sees it used in situations in which consequentialist logic does not add up to properly justify it. Thus I am curious to hear a good libertarian like Will praise Political Correctness while remaining silent on what I think of as its most salient and anti-libertarian feature.
Reply With Quote
  #10  
Old 07-27-2008, 05:38 PM
bjkeefe bjkeefe is offline
 
Join Date: Jan 2007
Location: Not Real America, according to St. Sa®ah
Posts: 21,798
Default Re: Political Correctness

JimM47:

A good essay.

I'm with you that PC-speak and the PC police can go too far. I have my own pet peeves in this regard; e.g., I dream of banning the icky suffix -challenged, I'm beyond tired of the overuse of words like community and folks, and I still wonder why we now have to say Asian when we're talking only about people from China and Japan, and not Indians, Pakistanis, Russians, Arabs, Persians, or Turks.

All that said, I think it's more good than bad to frown on the use of a lot of derogatory terms and the idle raising of related topics. Many, if not most, people who claim that they would like to "speak plainly" about "facts" really have little more than a wish to sustain stereotypes. Many, if not most, would like to explain highly complex societal phenomena by reaching first for easy generalizations like skin color, gender, or ethnic origin. I grant that it has become harder to talk about some things that shouldn't be immediately stigmatized, but it really seems to me that it's not at all impossible. You just have to be a little more careful about how and when you say certain things, and maybe willing to risk a little initial heat.

On the particular case of Summers: I don't really want to open up a long debate on this, since I'm not well-informed on the matter. I do want to say one thing, though. It was my impression at the time, from reading in between the lines, that many people were unhappy with him for a variety of other reasons, and that his "sexist" comment really was more of a convenient excuse than the sole reason for his ouster -- kind of like throwing Al Capone in jail for not paying his taxes.
__________________
Brendan
Reply With Quote
  #11  
Old 07-27-2008, 06:12 PM
jimM47 jimM47 is offline
 
Join Date: Apr 2007
Posts: 459
Default Re: Political Correctness

Quote:
All that said, I think it's more good than bad to frown on the use of a lot of derogatory terms and the idle raising of related topics. Many, if not most, people who claim that they would like to "speak plainly" about "facts" really have little more than a wish to sustain stereotypes.
I certainly agree that some who run afoul of Political Correctness are simply trying to cloak their racism/sexism/homophobia/xenophobia/etc and failing to elude detection — maybe those people are even the majority. But in my mind there is very clearly legitimate speech that is chilled or condemned by Political Correctness that should not be.

In determining which category someone falls into context matters immensely, and my problem with Political Correctness is not simply that it often gets it wrong, but that it has a systematic bias towards getting it wrong. Because it relies on social pressure, Political Correctness is least likely to stifle the very type of speech that is most likely to be cloaked racism: writing, and particularly anonymous writing. In contrast it tends to be employed most against the very types of speech that are most likely to be honest inquiries unmotivated by prejudice: in person speech by people putting themselves and their reputations on the line, particularly in an academic setting.

Your point on Summers's ouster is well taken, though I think the incident is still relevant. Even though his politically incorrect statement may have been merely the ostensible reason for his departure, it was still an important enough incident that it could serve as a convenient excuse. Al Capone getting hauled in for tax evasion still demonstrates that tax evasion is considered wrong enough to be punished.
Reply With Quote
  #12  
Old 07-27-2008, 07:18 PM
bjkeefe bjkeefe is offline
 
Join Date: Jan 2007
Location: Not Real America, according to St. Sa®ah
Posts: 21,798
Default Re: Political Correctness

jimM47:

Very good response. I especially agree with this:

Quote:
Because it relies on social pressure, Political Correctness is least likely to stifle the very type of speech that is most likely to be cloaked racism: writing, and particularly anonymous writing. In contrast it tends to be employed most against the very types of speech that are most likely to be honest inquiries unmotivated by prejudice: in person speech by people putting themselves and their reputations on the line, particularly in an academic setting.
It's a problem, no doubt. The only thing I can say is that while there are hurdles to talking about uncomfortable topics, it's generally not impossible to do so. It just requires a little more work. Admittedly, some of that work involves rather tiresome prefatory disclaiming and forelock-tugging.

I'll also grant the possibility that specific locales may feature especially hostile environments, and may even be prohibitive in some cases. That's a shame, and the only thing I can say here is what my mama always told me: Who ever told you that life was going to be fair?

Which is not to say that we should ever give up trying to make it more so.

One good thing about our current technology is that it's now a lot easier for someone to get controversial ideas out there in ways that make retribution less of a risk. So, to those hemmed in on the stereotypical university campus, where the humorless liberals won't let you say bad things about anybody except rich white men, and you don't yet have tenure, I say, start a pseudonymous blog. If the ideas have merit, they'll find support.
__________________
Brendan

Last edited by bjkeefe; 07-27-2008 at 07:21 PM..
Reply With Quote
  #13  
Old 07-27-2008, 07:28 PM
Happy Hominid Happy Hominid is offline
 
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: West Los Angeles, CA
Posts: 147
Default Re: Political Correctness

Not only that, Jim, but it also creates the famous "chilling effect". If I know little about the Summer case (and that is so), then I come away with the conclusion that it is dangerous for me to make this particular PC statement. It may well have been other issues that got him canned, but not in MY mind.

I don't see a way to defend PC talk ever. First of all, I'm huge on freedom of speech and I don't just mean it in the Constitutional sense. There are many arenas where true free speech gets stifled with the shrug - "this isn't a Free Speech issue" (note the upper case). People are a little too testy about defending their "free speech free" zones (think of blogs, churches, homes, etc).

Secondly, I agree with Jim's noting that PC can prevent us arriving at facts.

So, what's the answer to prevent what BJ fears if you don't have a certain amount of PC? How about simply acknowledging that facts about how the world IS, should not make us conclude that it's the way the world ought to be or how we ought to treat people?
__________________
It's another day in paradise...
Reply With Quote
  #14  
Old 07-27-2008, 05:10 PM
eric eric is offline
 
Join Date: Oct 2006
Posts: 58
Default Will Always Blue

Not metaphorically, but he always looks a little like a Zombie, kind of gray/blue, in contrast to his guests, who look like they have red blood cells in their viens.

Must have brains!
Reply With Quote
  #15  
Old 07-27-2008, 07:07 PM
Michael Michael is offline
 
Join Date: Jul 2008
Location: I live in Boston
Posts: 81
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Pardon me: but is Jesse´s hair GREEN?! or am I just watching this too late at night?...Please advise ---anyway, you two really helped me understand your topic...Thanks
Reply With Quote
  #16  
Old 07-28-2008, 04:11 AM
Eastwest Eastwest is offline
 
Join Date: Dec 2007
Posts: 592
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Quote:
Originally Posted by Michael View Post
Pardon me: but is Jesse´s hair GREEN?! or am I just watching this too late at night?
No, it's not green. It's blue.

EW

(I just figured he was out-of-the-closet-gay.)
Reply With Quote
  #17  
Old 07-27-2008, 07:40 PM
Bloggin' Noggin Bloggin' Noggin is offline
 
Join Date: Oct 2006
Posts: 893
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Can we please note a few things about the cognitivist/rationalist side of the philosophical debate over morality (as opposed to whatever debates may go under that name in psychology)?
First, as I see it, the cognitivist says that moral judgments make cognitive claims. From this, it in no way follows that "feelings" are not involved. If my body is out of balance, I will have a certain "feeling" of being out of balance and about to fall. This feeling will be the basis for a judgment that I am out of balance and about to fall -- a fully cognitive judgment.
And despite Jesse's rejection of cognitivist accounts of emotion, he gives a seemingly rather cognitivist account, which makes the "feeling" part of the emotion correspond to a kind of evidence for a certain judgment -- in much the way that my sense of being out of balance is evidence for the judgment that I am really out of balance -- here:
http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/128...9:31&out=12:40

In his example the feeling of fear is a sign that there is something dangerous around. And creatures like ourselves, not only mammals, but self-conscious mammals, are capable of distinguishing between cases where our fear is rational (an indication of a genuine danger) and where it is irrational (e.g. fear of plastic spiders). And to the degree that we are rational, we can discount this misfiring signal in action -- and perhaps even train ourselves with practice not to be afraid after all.

Second, can we please distinguish between saying that moral claims are statements about reasons and that correct moral judgments identify a certain kind of reason for action from the quite different claim that our moral judgments are all reached through REASONING. A baseball player does not throw each pitch by reasoning. Rather, he throws by what we sometimes call "instinct", but what is really "second-nature" or habit. Someone who tried to reason out every single throw would be a worse pitcher than a four year-old. But it doesn't follow that there is no reality beyond my instinct itself that determines whether I have reason to throw in some different way. Ultimately physics and the rules and strategy of baseball are going to determine whether I should retrain my "instincts" or not. The question for the rationalist is not whether every moral decision is conducted by REASONING, but rather whether our moral dispositions are responsive to whatever moral reasons we have.

Will recognizes that much economic knowledge is "tacit knowledge". A good businessman may develop a "sense" of where a good opportunity lies that he could not spell out. The fact that the good businessman can't spell out his knowledge very well doesn't make it any less knowledge. (Same goes for a good scientist, guiding his students into more promising research project or away from unwarranted interpretations of the evidence.) But in the case of morality, as soon as we show that much moral understanding is tacit, we must for some reason conclude that it is guided by absolutely nothing.
Again, Will recognizes in the Hayek diavlog that much information is socially dispersed. If you are trained as a physicist, a bunch of norms and "best practices" are more or less programmed into you, and a lot of factual claims from other disciplines are fed to you that you simply don't go out and verify for yourself. You could easily tell a story of scientific norms that makes them look just as random and unjustified as moral norms. You are going to inherit and even unconsciously imbibe many of your scientific norms from previous generations of scientists. No individual is in a position to justify (or even fully grasp all the scientific norms he's following. If you are going to present how the Romans thought about blood sports as evidence for the non-existence of moral facts, then one should be able to present the way they thought about physics as evidence that physics is culturally relative as well. Of course that will strike Will and Jesse as silly, but that's just because they are begging the question against moral realism.
I'm not clear what the philosophical significance of "nativism" is -- certainly it has very little to do with the realism/anti-realism debate. The EP types who believe morality was itself designed by evolution are just as likely to regard that as a reason why we can't trust our moral intuitions. In fact, I think a moral realist is probably better off assimilating "the moral sense" to the businessman's "profit sense" or the scientist's "sense" of what theories are promising and which are not or the baseball player's "sense" of whether he's hit the ball out of the park or not.

Finally, when Will and Jesse get around to the question of normativity, Jesse suggests that, depending on what "we" want to do as a society, we may be able to determine which moral norms are better than others. But that "we" is precisely where he begs the question. Will speaks of what "we" want as being a matter for negotiation. Is that fair and impartial negotiation or strong-arm negotiation? If what "we" want is determined only by the dominant class or the men or the non-slaves, is that really what "we" want?

How we get from individual reasons/ individual ends to social reasons and social ends is precisely what morality is about.
Morality must be self-enforced to some degree (I mean most people must to some degree be their own moral policeman). If I am a slave, do I have any kind of reason (beyond pure self-interest) to enforce (on myself) any supposed duty not to run away? If not, then the moral claim is false -- even though everybody in the society believes that it is true. Suppose that morality claims to have authority over us on the grounds that it is impartial -- that it takes everyone's interest into account, including my interests. Then, if my interests as a slave have not actually been taken into account, I have no moral duty not to run away and the claim that I do is false -- despite the anthropologist's claim that "it is immoral for slaves to run away in society X."
Reply With Quote
  #18  
Old 07-27-2008, 08:41 PM
Ocean Ocean is offline
 
Join Date: Jun 2008
Location: US Northeast
Posts: 6,784
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Quote:
Originally Posted by Bloggin' Noggin View Post
Can we please note a few things about the cognitivist/rationalist side of the philosophical debate over morality (as opposed to whatever debates may go under that name in psychology)?
First, as I see it, the cognitivist says that moral judgments make cognitive claims. From this, it in no way follows that "feelings" are not involved. If my body is out of balance, I will have a certain "feeling" of being out of balance and about to fall. This feeling will be the basis for a judgment that I am out of balance and about to fall -- a fully cognitive judgment.
I think you need to distinguish between "feeling" referring to sensory/perceptual experience and interpretation (like being out of balance) from the "feeling" associated with the experience of emotions.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Bloggin' Noggin View Post
And despite Jesse's rejection of cognitivist accounts of emotion, he gives a seemingly rather cognitivist account, which makes the "feeling" part of the emotion correspond to a kind of evidence for a certain judgment -- in much the way that my sense of being out of balance is evidence for the judgment that I am really out of balance -- here:
http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/128...9:31&out=12:40
My interpretation of what he said is simply that the emotion arises first and then the feeling is what links to the secondary cognitive part of the judgment. His "criticism" of rationalists had to do with not acknowledging the emotional origin of the sequence.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Bloggin' Noggin View Post
In his example the feeling of fear is a sign that there is something dangerous around. And creatures like ourselves, not only mammals, but self-conscious mammals, are capable of distinguishing between cases where our fear is rational (an indication of a genuine danger) and where it is irrational (e.g. fear of plastic spiders). And to the degree that we are rational, we can discount this misfiring signal in action -- and perhaps even train ourselves with practice not to be afraid after all.
Before our more developed psychological functions can process the perceptual stimulus of a spider, a more primitive area of the brain triggers an automatic physiological response of fear with its attached to preparation for action. Our ability to analyze these stimuli and ultimately, perhaps "cancel" the instinctive reflexive response is a posteriori. With training, the brain can learn to distinguish between the plastic spider and the real ones. At the level of sensory processing, the image of the plastic spider is sent to the "safe" area, and not trigger the response at all. But the first time ever that you saw a plastic spider, not even knowing of their existence, you probably had the same fear response as with the real one.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Bloggin' Noggin View Post
Second, can we please distinguish between saying that moral claims are statements about reasons and that correct moral judgments identify a certain kind of reason for action from the quite different claim that our moral judgments are all reached through REASONING. A baseball player does not throw each pitch by reasoning. Rather, he throws by what we sometimes call "instinct", but what is really "second-nature" or habit. Someone who tried to reason out every single throw would be a worse pitcher than a four year-old. But it doesn't follow that there is no reality beyond my instinct itself that determines whether I have reason to throw in some different way. Ultimately physics and the rules and strategy of baseball are going to determine whether I should retrain my "instincts" or not. The question for the rationalist is not whether every moral decision is conducted by REASONING, but rather whether our moral dispositions are responsive to whatever moral reasons we have.
There are some interesting studies that are somewhat related to this point. Juvenile delinquents were interviewed and asked about the reasons why they committed a crime. Almost all of them had some more or less rational justification for it. However, when describing the details of the crime itself, there was no evidence that they reasoned first and then acted. It was mostly a retroactive process. People need to justify their actions. Even when they plainly make a mistake, the tendency is to find a reason to justify it. I think Jesse refers to these justifications as reasons. A judgment reached through reasoning would be different in that it presumes a deliberation process before the judgment.



Quote:
Originally Posted by Bloggin' Noggin View Post
Finally, when Will and Jesse get around to the question of normativity, Jesse suggests that, depending on what "we" want to do as a society, we may be able to determine which moral norms are better than others. But that "we" is precisely where he begs the question. Will speaks of what "we" want as being a matter for negotiation. Is that fair and impartial negotiation or strong-arm negotiation? If what "we" want is determined only by the dominant class or the men or the non-slaves, is that really what "we" want?
I agree with this one. Jesse talks about making these decisions as if it was that simple...

Quote:
Originally Posted by Bloggin' Noggin View Post
How we get from individual reasons/ individual ends to social reasons and social ends is precisely what morality is about.
Morality must be self-enforced to some degree (I mean most people must to some degree be their own moral policeman). If I am a slave, do I have any kind of reason (beyond pure self-interest) to enforce (on myself) any supposed duty not to run away? If not, then the moral claim is false -- even though everybody in the society believes that it is true. Suppose that morality claims to have authority over us on the grounds that it is impartial -- that it takes everyone's interest into account, including my interests. Then, if my interests as a slave have not actually been taken into account, I have no moral duty not to run away and the claim that I do is false -- despite the anthropologist's claim that "it is immoral for slaves to run away in society X."
I think the problem here has to do with definitions. When the definition of morality varies so much depending on context, it is most likely that we are using the wrong definition. It appears to me that the definition of morality has to include the process of resolving contradictory sets of values.

Last edited by Ocean; 07-27-2008 at 08:45 PM..
Reply With Quote
  #19  
Old 07-28-2008, 10:38 AM
Bloggin' Noggin Bloggin' Noggin is offline
 
Join Date: Oct 2006
Posts: 893
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Quote:
Originally Posted by Ocean View Post
I think you need to distinguish between "feeling" referring to sensory/perceptual experience and interpretation (like being out of balance) from the "feeling" associated with the experience of emotions.
And what is this distinction I am to make? Jesse suggests that when I feel certain "fearful" sensations, I use that as an indicator or a "sign" that I am in danger, as I use certain hard to describe "vertiginous" feelings as indicators that I am out of balance. The "vertiginous" feelings may fire off even when I am actually not ready to fall (when I am lying in bed, for example), and the fearful sensations may fire off when I am not in danger (when there is really nothing to fear).
You (and Jesse) may feel there is some distinction to be made here (which would presumably make emotions less cognitive in some way), but my point is that this distinction has not been either made or justified.


Quote:
My interpretation of what he said is simply that the emotion arises first and then the feeling is what links to the secondary cognitive part of the judgment. His "criticism" of rationalists had to do with not acknowledging the emotional origin of the sequence.
My point is that Jesse is turning the rationalist into a strawman if he thinks that rationalists (e.g., Aristotle or even Kant himself) could not admit that our initial moral responses were "gut reactions" -- in the same way that our immediate responses to just about everything is a "gut reaction". You see a ball speeding toward you. If you have never been trained to catch, your reaction might be simply to flinch. A trained catcher's "gut reaction" is to reach out in just the right way and grab the ball from the air in a way that he simply doesn't have the time to reason his way towards. Or, to take Malcolm Gladwell's example, a normal museum visitor might look at a certain kouros and respond with admiration, or perhaps with wonder at it's old age, while an experienced collector might have the gut reaction that "there's something fishy about this" -- without being able to analyze it.
Emotions deal in "Gestalten", grasping the whole "lay of the land" at once from numerous, perhaps widely distributed tiny cues -- and thank God they do! Reasoning is obviously much too slow a process to guide us second-by-second. They also have a hard time learning directly from abstract reasoning or from report -- they need to learn from experience. But none of this means that these reactions are non-cognitive. None of it proves that careful reasoning couldn't show us how to retrain ourselves so that we (for example) feel fear only when we are actually in real danger -- as an athlete can first reason out the best way to catch a ball and then through careful experiential retraining, unlearn bad habits and eventually make this better way to catch a ball "second nature."

Quote:
Before our more developed psychological functions can process the perceptual stimulus of a spider, a more primitive area of the brain triggers an automatic physiological response of fear with its attached to preparation for action. Our ability to analyze these stimuli and ultimately, perhaps "cancel" the instinctive reflexive response is a posteriori. With training, the brain can learn to distinguish between the plastic spider and the real ones. At the level of sensory processing, the image of the plastic spider is sent to the "safe" area, and not trigger the response at all. But the first time ever that you saw a plastic spider, not even knowing of their existence, you probably had the same fear response as with the real one.
Perhaps I should have picked a different fear: for example, consider the very shy person who knows perfectly well in an intellectual way that people won't "bite his head off" if he talks to them, but who nevertheless is terrified of speaking to people. I had in mind someone who was still horrified by plastic spiders even when he knew they were plastic -- or horrified by real but harmless spiders when he knows perfectly well that they are harmless. These fears are "irrational" precisely because the "feeling" of fear is not merely a feeling but rather a kind of "warning light" or siren that says "danger! danger!"

Quote:
There are some interesting studies that are somewhat related to this point. Juvenile delinquents were interviewed and asked about the reasons why they committed a crime. Almost all of them had some more or less rational justification for it. However, when describing the details of the crime itself, there was no evidence that they reasoned first and then acted. It was mostly a retroactive process. People need to justify their actions. Even when they plainly make a mistake, the tendency is to find a reason to justify it. I think Jesse refers to these justifications as reasons. A judgment reached through reasoning would be different in that it presumes a deliberation process before the judgment.
To say "I had a reason to do that" is not the same as to say "I reasoned my way to doing that." Some after-the-fact explanations of reasons for instantaneous decisions will match reality pretty well and others will not at all. Suppose a mathematician sees a problem and without any conscious calculation comes to the right answer "in a flash of insight". Afterwards, he works through the calculations and proves that his instantaneous vision was correct. This after-the-fact calculation seems to justify his claim to have "seen" the correct answer -- even though we all know perfectly well that he didn't (consciously) work through this entire hour-long calculation on his way to the answer. There WAS a reason for him to come to that answer, and he seems to have "seen" that reason, though he didn't do much REASONING ahead of time.

Clearly when the after-the-fact "justification" turns out to depend upon a lot fo distortions of actual events, the claim that there was a good reason to act as you did is unsupported. Someone who is constantly on the look-out for slights may think he had a reason to be angry when you "looked at him funny". Someone else of a more confident, but mild-mannered disposition may believe he had reason to be angry. In neither case did someone "reason his way to anger", but the second person's claim is more immediately credible.
Reply With Quote
  #20  
Old 07-28-2008, 12:53 AM
Wonderment Wonderment is offline
 
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: Southern California
Posts: 5,694
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Quote:
Finally, when Will and Jesse get around to the question of normativity, Jesse suggests that, depending on what "we" want to do as a society, we may be able to determine which moral norms are better than others. But that "we" is precisely where he begs the question. Will speaks of what "we" want as being a matter for negotiation. Is that fair and impartial negotiation or strong-arm negotiation? If what "we" want is determined only by the dominant class or the men or the non-slaves, is that really what "we" want?
I thought Jesse suggested that "we" can only ask the question as individuals. He says that and explicates it here:

http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/128...5:20&out=56:17
__________________
Seek Peace and Pursue it
בקש שלום ורדפהו
Busca la paz y síguela
--Psalm 34:15
Reply With Quote
  #21  
Old 07-28-2008, 07:27 AM
Bloggin' Noggin Bloggin' Noggin is offline
 
Join Date: Oct 2006
Posts: 893
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Here is a clear case of Will and Jesse both totally misreading the question of moral reality by psychologizing the question: http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/128...0&out=00:28:03

The question (as I said above) of whether there is a moral reality which ought to guide (some of) our moral reactions IS NOT, NOT, NOT the same question as whether we have a built-in moral sense. Only an a question-begging assumption that there is no such thing as moral reality could lead to so obvious a conflation of totally different questions.

Nothing is more obvious from experiment and experience than that we do not have a good sense for probability. Even experts in probability are liable to make stupid mistakes in estimating probability in ordinary life. Does it follow that there is no reality that OUGHT to guide our ascriptions of probability?

If I believe that current physics is getting at physical reality, am I somehow committed to the view that modern physics was inevitable or that every culture in the world is just as "right" about physical reality as is "the modern West"? (I'm not suggesting that the West is morally superior to other cultures -- only pointing out that there is no reason to suppose that moral reality must be equally understood by all cultures.
Maybe this confusion is simply a part of the "quick and dirty" version for us, the public. But it IS a HUGE confusion.
I can see how psychologists might be confused about this kind of thing, but it's depressing to see contemporary philosophers confused about it.

Another huge confusion is Will's when he assumes that conservatives should be most upset by relativism. Actually, relativism tends, if anything, to support a fairly conservative attitude toward moral norms. It's the reformer who has got to persuade people to make difficult changes in the name of moral, but non-conventional concern -- to treat black people more equally (even where they are sufficiently in the minority that you could continue to oppress them) and even to rectify past injustices at some expense to one's own future prospects.

Last edited by Bloggin' Noggin; 07-28-2008 at 08:07 AM..
Reply With Quote
  #22  
Old 07-28-2008, 09:24 AM
Jay J Jay J is offline
 
Join Date: Oct 2006
Location: Little Rock, AR
Posts: 436
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Hi again Bloggin,

I want to go on record as saying that what you offer in this post is wisdom. Our purported lack of a distinctive built-in moral sense is not the same question as whether or not there is a moral reality.

I liked your post so much that I hesitate to add this caveat... see I just don't know if we mean the same thing by "moral reality." I'll go out on a limb and say that the diavloggers, by 'moral reality' are meaning something similar to what I mean in our long-running thread.

Hopefully since we've been around a couple of times on this one, I won't be out of line using the ambiguous term "metaphysical" to describe what the participants are getting at with the concept of moral reality.

So do you think it would be beneficial at this still early stage of the discussion to get the meanings out on the table?

I don't hear the participants as saying that moral systems can't be rational, or even universalizable in principle.
Reply With Quote
  #23  
Old 07-28-2008, 09:51 AM
AemJeff AemJeff is offline
 
Join Date: Feb 2007
Posts: 7,750
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Quote:
Originally Posted by Bloggin' Noggin View Post
Here is a clear case of Will and Jesse both totally misreading the question of moral reality by psychologizing the question: http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/128...0&out=00:28:03

The question (as I said above) of whether there is a moral reality which ought to guide (some of) our moral reactions IS NOT, NOT, NOT the same question as whether we have a built-in moral sense. Only an a question-begging assumption that there is no such thing as moral reality could lead to so obvious a conflation of totally different questions.

Nothing is more obvious from experiment and experience than that we do not have a good sense for probability. Even experts in probability are liable to make stupid mistakes in estimating probability in ordinary life. Does it follow that there is no reality that OUGHT to guide our ascriptions of probability?

If I believe that current physics is getting at physical reality, am I somehow committed to the view that modern physics was inevitable or that every culture in the world is just as "right" about physical reality as is "the modern West"? (I'm not suggesting that the West is morally superior to other cultures -- only pointing out that there is no reason to suppose that moral reality must be equally understood by all cultures.
Maybe this confusion is simply a part of the "quick and dirty" version for us, the public. But it IS a HUGE confusion.
I can see how psychologists might be confused about this kind of thing, but it's depressing to see contemporary philosophers confused about it.

Another huge confusion is Will's when he assumes that conservatives should be most upset by relativism. Actually, relativism tends, if anything, to support a fairly conservative attitude toward moral norms. It's the reformer who has got to persuade people to make difficult changes in the name of moral, but non-conventional concern -- to treat black people more equally (even where they are sufficiently in the minority that you could continue to oppress them) and even to rectify past injustices at some expense to one's own future prospects.
But surely, if there's some analog of physical reality underlying morality, there's no reason to consider it's existence independently of human psychology. (As I read that sentence back, I see it contains an internal contradiction.) Why should we assume than an independent, objective place where morality can be measured independently of psychology is even worth considering? The idea just seems to come freighted with a lot of unnecessary baggage, and seems (to me) to beg for an application of Occam's Razor.

By unnecessary baggage, I mean I don't see how the idea stands alone. It needs some kind of supporting structure against which its calibrations can be measured. What is that?

By contrast, if you assume that morality is entirely subjective (based in psychological phenomena) - for example starting with self-interest and empathy then filtered through cultural norms - you don't need to assume the existence of, or build from scratch, some sort of objective superstructure (moral reality) in which the system hangs.

If you do assume that ideas of morality follow as a self-organized consequence of human psychology, doesn't it make sense to argue from psychology?
__________________
-A. E. M. Jeff (Eponym)
Magnets - We know how they work!

Last edited by AemJeff; 07-28-2008 at 10:05 AM.. Reason: clarity
Reply With Quote
  #24  
Old 07-28-2008, 10:31 AM
Ocean Ocean is offline
 
Join Date: Jun 2008
Location: US Northeast
Posts: 6,784
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Quote:
Originally Posted by AemJeff View Post
But surely, if there's some analog of physical reality underlying morality, there's no reason to consider it's existence independently of human psychology. (As I read that sentence back, I see it contains an internal contradiction.) Why should we assume than an independent, objective place where morality can be measured independently of psychology is even worth considering? The idea just seems to come freighted with a lot of unnecessary baggage, and seems (to me) to beg for an application of Occam's Razor.

By unnecessary baggage, I mean I don't see how the idea stands alone. It needs some kind of supporting structure against which its calibrations can be measured. What is that?

By contrast, if you assume that morality is entirely subjective (based in psychological phenomena) - for example starting with self-interest and empathy then filtered through cultural norms - you don't need to assume the existence of, or build from scratch, some sort of objective superstructure (moral reality) in which the system hangs.

If you do assume that ideas of morality follow as a self-organized consequence of human psychology, doesn't it make sense to argue from psychology?
Thank you AemJeff.

Depending on our professional biases we tend to view these topics from different perspectives. The philosopher may indulge in analyzing the world of mental abstractions. The psychologist studies how and why that mental abstraction was produced. But the bottom line is that it is very difficult to ignore the "psychological" aspects of anything we think if we really want to understand the mechanics of it. "Psychologizing" which is used in such a derogatory way is exactly what you need to do in order to examine this aspect of morality. If you want to look at the external function of morality, or compare it across cultures, without looking at its genesis within an individual, then you can more or less ignore the more purely psychological aspects.
The construction of a moral reality sets the direction in which a culture that endorses that morality attempts to go. The good of the one versus the good of the many is a classical knot in morality, both theoretical and practical. What we know as judeo-christian morality, regardless of the religious implications, has set the tone for the western world. However, we are far from reaching that kind of moral development. Why is that? If you don't look at the tight ties that we still have to our more primitive, instinctual modes of behavior (psychological phenomena), you can't understand where we are stuck. Again, both levels are necessary, the formulation of an external moral goal, and the understanding of how psychological phenomena (and cultural derivatives) presents obstacles to achieving that goal.
Reply With Quote
  #25  
Old 07-28-2008, 12:43 PM
Bloggin' Noggin Bloggin' Noggin is offline
 
Join Date: Oct 2006
Posts: 893
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Ocean,
You seem to object to my use of the word "psychologizing" on some very general terms. What I meant is that the diavloggers start with a non-psychological claim (there is a moral reality to which some moral claims correspond) and they identify it with a very particular view about certain psychological mechanisms.
My claim is that this identification is wholly unwarranted. Moral realism could easily be true even if the particular psychological claims they identify it with are false; and moral realism could be false even if there is a specially selected "moral sense".

I'm certainly not claiming that psychology has absolutely nothing to do with morality or moral reality. I'm simply saying that eitehr one of the following views could be true without the other:

A) Human beings have evolved with a "purpose-built" moral sense (something like our linguistic sense).
and
B) Some moral claims are literally true, and true independently of whether people happen to believe them or accept them as their own norms.
Reply With Quote
  #26  
Old 07-28-2008, 12:28 PM
Bloggin' Noggin Bloggin' Noggin is offline
 
Join Date: Oct 2006
Posts: 893
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Quote:
Originally Posted by AemJeff View Post
But surely, if there's some analog of physical reality underlying morality, there's no reason to consider it's existence independently of human psychology. (As I read that sentence back, I see it contains an internal contradiction.) Why should we assume than an independent, objective place where morality can be measured independently of psychology is even worth considering? The idea just seems to come freighted with a lot of unnecessary baggage, and seems (to me) to beg for an application of Occam's Razor.

By unnecessary baggage, I mean I don't see how the idea stands alone. It needs some kind of supporting structure against which its calibrations can be measured. What is that?

By contrast, if you assume that morality is entirely subjective (based in psychological phenomena) - for example starting with self-interest and empathy then filtered through cultural norms - you don't need to assume the existence of, or build from scratch, some sort of objective superstructure (moral reality) in which the system hangs.

If you do assume that ideas of morality follow as a self-organized consequence of human psychology, doesn't it make sense to argue from psychology?
Let's back up a bit. I am NOT primarily offering a particular picture of moral reality. Rather, I am criticizing an inference made by our diavloggers.
Here is the inference:

If moral realism is true (i.e., if there is such a thing as moral truth), human beings must have a built in "moral sense" whose purpose is to detect moral truth.
What principle is this inference based on? Well, apparently, it is based on this principle:
If there are true claims within a certain subject-matter, then human beings will have a built-in ability to detect the truth in this subject matter.

My previous post shows that this principle is ridiculously implausible. There are radio waves, but human beings have no built-in sense for radio waves.

Perhaps they are relying on some narrower principle. What is this narrower principle?
Be careful, though: if you restrict it entirely to moral discourse and moral reality, then you are simply begging the question.
Again, I am NOT here claiming that moral reality is exactly like physical reality in every respect. I am simply pointing out that a certain inference made by our diavloggers is a truly rotten inference.

A quick comment on this:
Quote:
By contrast, if you assume that morality is entirely subjective (based in psychological phenomena)
Here, you appear to confuse two quite different notions of "subjective"
In one sense, all of psychology is "subjective" -- it concerns what is going on in peoople's minds. But it DOES NOT follow from this that psychology is "subjective" in the sense that whatever you think about it is correct. There is a psychological reality which is independent of what people think about it: for example people may believe in the Oedipus Complex, but that doesn't mean that the Oedipus Complex is a psychological reality. Commonsense psychological views may be wrong in various ways as well.
Moral reality may well be psychological, but it doesn't follow that moral reality is identical with our beliefs about moral reality. Moral reality may not be identical with our moral norms, even though moral reality lies within the psycho-social realm.
Reply With Quote
  #27  
Old 07-28-2008, 01:08 PM
AemJeff AemJeff is offline
 
Join Date: Feb 2007
Posts: 7,750
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Quote:
Originally Posted by Bloggin' Noggin View Post
A quick comment on this:

Here, you appear to confuse two quite different notions of "subjective"
In one sense, all of psychology is "subjective" -- it concerns what is going on in peoople's minds. But it DOES NOT follow from this that psychology is "subjective" in the sense that whatever you think about it is correct. There is a psychological reality which is independent of what people think about it: for example people may believe in the Oedipus Complex, but that doesn't mean that the Oedipus Complex is a psychological reality. Commonsense psychological views may be wrong in various ways as well.
Moral reality may well be psychological, but it doesn't follow that moral reality is identical with our beliefs about moral reality. Moral reality may not be identical with our moral norms, even though moral reality lies within the psycho-social realm.
I need to think about the first part of your respsonse. Regarding the above, it's possible I'm abusing the term I (it wouldn't be the first time), but what I have in mind is that there's no external yardstick, no way to fix a quantitative judgment that could stand empirically.

Three olives is more than two olives is a different kind of assertion than rape is a greater crime than theft.
__________________
-A. E. M. Jeff (Eponym)
Magnets - We know how they work!
Reply With Quote
  #28  
Old 07-28-2008, 04:53 PM
Bloggin' Noggin Bloggin' Noggin is offline
 
Join Date: Oct 2006
Posts: 893
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Quote:
Originally Posted by AemJeff View Post
I need to think about the first part of your respsonse. Regarding the above, it's possible I'm abusing the term I (it wouldn't be the first time), but what I have in mind is that there's no external yardstick, no way to fix a quantitative judgment that could stand empirically.

Three olives is more than two olives is a different kind of assertion than rape is a greater crime than theft.
Your initial interpretation of "subjective" is "psychological" or "having to do with mental states -- the first of these is your parenthetical gloss on "subjective." You then seem to move to something like what you offer here: where people disagree (or rather appear to disagree) about a "subjective" issue, neither is right and neither is wrong. As I pointed out with my Oedipus Complex example, this inference is bad. And that point about the inference is my main concern.

I wonder whether you would be willing to admit that being raped is a greater harm than being deprived of say 50 dollars -- because I think its being a greater crime is dependent upon its being a greater harm. Would you at least concede that a tiny scratch on the finger is a lesser harm than being drawn and quartered?
Reply With Quote
  #29  
Old 07-28-2008, 07:34 PM
AemJeff AemJeff is offline
 
Join Date: Feb 2007
Posts: 7,750
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Quote:
Originally Posted by Bloggin' Noggin View Post
Your initial interpretation of "subjective" is "psychological" or "having to do with mental states -- the first of these is your parenthetical gloss on "subjective." You then seem to move to something like what you offer here: where people disagree (or rather appear to disagree) about a "subjective" issue, neither is right and neither is wrong. As I pointed out with my Oedipus Complex example, this inference is bad. And that point about the inference is my main concern.

I wonder whether you would be willing to admit that being raped is a greater harm than being deprived of say 50 dollars -- because I think its being a greater crime is dependent upon its being a greater harm. Would you at least concede that a tiny scratch on the finger is a lesser harm than being drawn and quartered?
Quickly, on the definition of "subjective," I think I was referring to it in terms of "psychology" as a way of saying that moral judgments reference nothing that exists independently of mind, no outside standard. That's an awkward exegesis, which probably means that I didn't choose my phrasing very well.

I've quoted what you said about the inference you're talking about for reference:
Quote:
If moral realism is true (i.e., if there is such a thing as moral truth), human beings must have a built in "moral sense" whose purpose is to detect moral truth.
What principle is this inference based on? Well, apparently, it is based on this principle:
If there are true claims within a certain subject-matter, then human beings will have a built-in ability to detect the truth in this subject matter.
And the following is what I've most directly been responding to:
Quote:
Only an a question-begging assumption that there is no such thing as moral reality could lead to so obvious a conflation of totally different questions.
"If there are true claims..." seems like an important condition, here. Part of my argument is that I don't see a reason to make that assumption, quite the reverse. To have me drawn and quartered would indeed be a great harm. To cut my finger would be a lesser harm. These can measured by the degree and the permanence of the damage done to me, as an organism. But degree of harm isn't necessarily identical to a measure of morality. Wonderment and Thus Spoke Elvis, to use names we're familiar with, would disagree on whether inflicting bodily harm on an enemy captive in a time of war was a moral act. It's easy to imagine scenarios where someone felt greater harm from the loss of fifty dollars vs. being raped. It would be extraordinary, but there's no reason it couldn't be true. I think there are metrics that we can use as yardsticks, and I think some of them probably carry more force than others. I can easily bring myself to believe that there could be "global" value that we all share, but I don't think that's inevitable.

My aim has mainly been to assert my belief that assuming an underlying moral reality seems to be the more difficult case to make. And if you don't make that assumption, then there is a different set of rules by which we would evaluate morality than otherwise.
__________________
-A. E. M. Jeff (Eponym)
Magnets - We know how they work!

Last edited by AemJeff; 07-28-2008 at 08:18 PM.. Reason: Add graf about "subjective" and a little clarification
Reply With Quote
  #30  
Old 07-30-2008, 07:48 AM
Bloggin' Noggin Bloggin' Noggin is offline
 
Join Date: Oct 2006
Posts: 893
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Hi Jeff,
Sorry my responses are so long in coming these days. I recognize that we were all taught in high school that there was no moral truth, and that this dogma has taken on the status of common sense -- of the blindingly obvious, even -- as a result. But before our high school teachers taught us this, it was a bunch of arguments made by philosophers (like A.J. Ayer) against the prevailing commonsense moral realism. The arguments offered by those philosophers were based upon assumptions that we now recognize to be false and unworkable in every other sphere of knowledge. We need to re-confront the question with an open mind.

Quote:
Originally Posted by AemJeff View Post
Quickly, on the definition of "subjective," I think I was referring to it in terms of "psychology" as a way of saying that moral judgments reference nothing that exists independently of mind, no outside standard. That's an awkward exegesis, which probably means that I didn't choose my phrasing very well.
Here you attempt to straddle the same chasm you attempted to straddle last time -- this time with the aid of the very expansive term "external". Consider the question of whether I am in pain. Surely that is a question that concerns mental states --something that "depends on the mind". Does it follow that there is "no external standard" whether I am in pain or not? Well, if YOU are attempting to determine whether I am in pain or just faking it, then the standard of whether your guess is right or not is certainly external to you and your mind. There is a fact of the matter about whether I am in pain -- an empirically determinable fact about whether I am in pain, for which non-mental facts are certainly relevant evidence (e.g., is an arrow sticking out of my shoulder? do my cries sound real or fake?)
Let me concede for the sake of argument (and because it seems plausible) that if there are any facts that underwrite some moral norms and not others, they are psycho-social facts.
It does not follow from the claim that the psychosocial facts in question are the facts about what norms people believe.

Quote:
I've quoted what you said about the inference you're talking about for reference:

And the following is what I've most directly been responding to:

"If there are true claims..." seems like an important condition, here. Part of my argument is that I don't see a reason to make that assumption, quite the reverse.
You seem to interpret me as making that assumption myself. Rather, I am attributing the WHOLE CONDITIONAL -- the whole "if-then" statement to Will and Jesse. They are assuming that someone who believes in moral realism is committed to a certain claim about human beings possessing a certain psychic "module". My claim is that they are completely wrong in thinking that the moral realist is in any way committed to such a claim.

You seem to be saying "if we suppose from the get-go that moral realism is false (based apparently on your conflation of "mental" with "non-factual" or "rationally indeterminable"), THEN the best way to interpret moral realism is as an attempt to make some claim about a "moral module" in all humans. Maybe once we get to a genuinely sound argument against moral realism, this will be the best interpretation of the bee moral realists had in their bonnets. But it is still clearly a huge distortion of what they actually MEAN!

If I claim that I am Jesus Christ, it is certainly possible that I just mean to make some kind of metaphorical claim. But the mere fact that you find my claim crazy (or even the fact that it really is crazy) doesn't show that I don't mean exactly what I say.

What I've been saying all along is that Will and Jesse, rather than offering any kind of argument against moral realists, simply argue against somebody else, all the while claiming that they are arguing against moral realism.

W & J claim to be offering an argument against moral realism, but that their argument actually begs the question against moral realism, because only someone who already thinks moral realism is false would interpret moral realism to mean what they take it to mean.
Your reaction perfectly underwrites my claim. W&J offer an argument against moral realism that is based on conflating it with something else. You attempt to justify their substitution on the grounds that moral realism is implausible to begin with -- before their argument is ever offered. In that case their argument against moral realism is indeed question-beggingly dependent upon an assumption of what they intended to prove (that moral realism is false).
Reply With Quote
  #31  
Old 07-30-2008, 10:32 AM
AemJeff AemJeff is offline
 
Join Date: Feb 2007
Posts: 7,750
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Thanks for the response, BN. I can't fully respond to you right now, but I'm interested in a clarification. Would Moral Reality have existed before there were beings capable of judging morality? If there were two unrelated species, both of which were capable of practicing ,and actually practiced, moral judgment, would they each be drawing their judgments from the same Moral Reality?
__________________
-A. E. M. Jeff (Eponym)
Magnets - We know how they work!
Reply With Quote
  #32  
Old 08-01-2008, 05:00 PM
Bloggin' Noggin Bloggin' Noggin is offline
 
Join Date: Oct 2006
Posts: 893
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Quote:
Originally Posted by AemJeff View Post
Thanks for the response, BN. I can't fully respond to you right now, but I'm interested in a clarification. Would Moral Reality have existed before there were beings capable of judging morality? If there were two unrelated species, both of which were capable of practicing ,and actually practiced, moral judgment, would they each be drawing their judgments from the same Moral Reality?
Sorry that I didn't see this post until now, Jeff. Jay J brought it to my attention and I answered it in a reply to him on the other thread. Although it's not ideal, I'm going to just reproduce my answer to him below (including a bit more than directly responds to your most recent point). If any of it is unclear, please let me know:


Quote:
In other words, I think something like "Morality claims to have tapped into some feature of the universe like matter or energy," needs to be posited before I feel comfortable stating D. And this can happen *before* we decide whether morality has successfully described the world through these claims.
This is rather vague -- like matter or energy HOW? -- entirely non-psychological? something that existed before humans or any self-conscious rational agents ever arose?
That's way too much to build in from the very beginning. Moral judgments do not cover the interaction of matter and energy alone -- they don't even apply to "brutes" (ie animals who are incapable of stepping back from their immediate inclinations to govern their behavior by norms). A tiger may be dangerous, but it isn't morally bad when it attacks me. Why then should we expect moral reality to be something that existed before any rational agents came into existence? Even Kant -- the most extravagant rationalst/realist is not committed to such a claim! (Of course, Kant believed in God, so for him there was no time before rational agents existed for him, but his account makes it quite clear that morality is the set of rules willed by rational agents as law for the "kingdom of ends" (all rational agents). If there were only matter and energy and no rational beings whatsoever, there would be no kingdom of ends and no willing of the law, and so presumably no moral truth -- at least nothing beyond a conditional claim about what such beings WOULD will.



Quote:
In other words AemJeff's question (see below) needs to be unequivocally answered "yes" before I feel comfortable in granting the authority you say that morality claims for itself in D.

"If there were two unrelated species, both of which were capable of practicing ,and actually practiced, moral judgment, would they each be drawing their judgments from the same Moral Reality?"
This standard is a bit better -- at least Kant turns out to be a moral realist on this view. But seemingly Aristotle (and quite possibly Plato) does not. To stipulate from the outset a definition of "moral realist" that doesn't even consider some of our paradigm cases of moral realists strikes me pretty high-handed. Perhaps morality claims to govern all self-conscious rational beings anywhere in the universe, but if we had to give up only this claim, our moral practices would not be severely threatened -- not at any rate until we had to deal with actual Martian invaders.

Taking up the medical model of morality favored by Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and most of the philosophers of the ancient world, let's restate Jeff's challenge:
"If there are two species who both practice medicine and both make medical judgments, are they both drawing their judgments from the same medical reality?"
In one sense, the answer is "no". An alien species might have a vastly different physiology, and treatments that restart a stopped human heart might not restart an alien heart and vice versa. In another sense, we might say "yes" -- veterinarians can learn how to treat horses, pigs, cows and lizards, and horse-medicine and pig-medicine are certainly branches of medical knowledge. There's no reason to suppose that human doctors couldn't learn how to treat aliens and vice versa.
But the bottom line is this: Suppose I go to my doctor with certain symptoms. He comes up with a diagnosis and treatment -- say he recommends a low-fat diet, cardio exercise and a statin drug. Now my doctor knows nothing about the treatment of chickens or cockroaches or Vulcans. Does this provide me with ANY reason whatsoever to doubt his prescription? There may be many reasons for medical skepticism, but the fact that my doctor couldn't treat Mr. Spock is not among them -- it's simply a non sequitur.
If moral prescriptions hold for all human beings, but not for all rational agents, that might not constitute maximal moral realism, but surely it is a pretty significant form of moral realism -- all we would need for any practical purposes until we actually met the Vulcans or the Borg.
Reply With Quote
  #33  
Old 08-03-2008, 07:26 PM
AemJeff AemJeff is offline
 
Join Date: Feb 2007
Posts: 7,750
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Quote:
Originally Posted by Bloggin' Noggin View Post
This standard is a bit better -- at least Kant turns out to be a moral realist on this view. But seemingly Aristotle (and quite possibly Plato) does not. To stipulate from the outset a definition of "moral realist" that doesn't even consider some of our paradigm cases of moral realists strikes me pretty high-handed.
Aristotle and Plato, and even Kant to a certain extent, imagined a significantly different universe than the one we now believe we occupy. The Greeks saw themselves at the center of creation. We believe that there's nothing special about us at all. That's a significantly different worldview and it doesn't support all of the same assumptions. If they held that some things were universal, based on a belief in their own (our own) exceptionalism that's contradicted by what we know (or believe we know) about the world at this date, how reluctant should we be to, let's say, define down the necessity of the content of some of those beliefs.

I understand your point about humility, and I acknowledge that it's absurd for non-specialist (to put it delicately) like myself to make that assertion, but still...
__________________
-A. E. M. Jeff (Eponym)
Magnets - We know how they work!
Reply With Quote
  #34  
Old 08-05-2008, 10:09 AM
Bloggin' Noggin Bloggin' Noggin is offline
 
Join Date: Oct 2006
Posts: 893
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Quote:
Originally Posted by AemJeff View Post
Aristotle and Plato, and even Kant to a certain extent, imagined a significantly different universe than the one we now believe we occupy. The Greeks saw themselves at the center of creation. We believe that there's nothing special about us at all. That's a significantly different worldview and it doesn't support all of the same assumptions. If they held that some things were universal, based on a belief in their own (our own) exceptionalism that's contradicted by what we know (or believe we know) about the world at this date, how reluctant should we be to, let's say, define down the necessity of the content of some of those beliefs.

I understand your point about humility, and I acknowledge that it's absurd for non-specialist (to put it delicately) like myself to make that assertion, but still...
I don't think you understood my point. It was not an objection to you or any non-expert talking about the subject. My point is that it's possible to define a view you want to attack so restrictively that nearly everyone has to reject it, but that is not a fair strategy of argument.
Plato and Aristotle both held views of moral truth that could easily allow for a difference between moral truth for humans and moral truth for Martians. They regarded "justice" for instance as the "health" of soul and society.
My point is that you (and people who really SHOULD know better -- e.g., Shaun Nichols) are defining moral realism UP, not down. It isn't quite like attacking strawmen, because Kant actually occupies the position -- I mean he thinks morality applies to all rational agents as such; I don't mean that he accepts all the stupidities unsympathetic types attribute to him. But it would be rather like attacking all of free market economics by attacking just one school of thought within it.

I'd be interested to see how your objection here (which maybe I just don't understand) applies to my development of the above point about health. IS it really an objection to my doctor's recommendations for me that they don't apply to Martians?
Reply With Quote
  #35  
Old 08-05-2008, 12:10 PM
AemJeff AemJeff is offline
 
Join Date: Feb 2007
Posts: 7,750
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Quote:
Originally Posted by Bloggin' Noggin View Post
I don't think you understood my point. It was not an objection to you or any non-expert talking about the subject. My point is that it's possible to define a view you want to attack so restrictively that nearly everyone has to reject it, but that is not a fair strategy of argument.
Plato and Aristotle both held views of moral truth that could easily allow for a difference between moral truth for humans and moral truth for Martians. They regarded "justice" for instance as the "health" of soul and society.
My point is that you (and people who really SHOULD know better -- e.g., Shaun Nichols) are defining moral realism UP, not down. It isn't quite like attacking strawmen, because Kant actually occupies the position -- I mean he thinks morality applies to all rational agents as such; I don't mean that he accepts all the stupidities unsympathetic types attribute to him. But it would be rather like attacking all of free market economics by attacking just one school of thought within it.

I'd be interested to see how your objection here (which maybe I just don't understand) applies to my development of the above point about health. IS it really an objection to my doctor's recommendations for me that they don't apply to Martians?
Hi BN, the "non-specialist" reference was just me poking a little fun at myself for suggesting something I thought might be seen as somewhat arrogant.

It may be that my bottom line objection is really to the nomenclature, we'll see. Defining "moral reality" seems to me to imply a universally applicable set of rules to behavior by... is "moral agents" a useful term? I'll use it for the moment. Maybe I assume too much, but in this context "reality" seems to imply a fundamental, fixed basis - e.g. the proposition Slavery is not a moral practice might be considered always true. Or, if that's too simplistic, moral reality could be a set of rules by which we could judge the proposition I used within a given context. Forced to judge both of these options I'd reject the first, unconditionally. I don't believe there can be simple moral propositions about which a fixed truth value could be universally agreed upon. If we allow for meta-propositions (rules for creating true propositions in particular contexts) I'm not as sure of myself. I don't believe such things are possible, but it would require a much subtler argument to rule it out, I think.

I haven't really made my arguments in this post, but I thought I'd state the problem as I see it, as simply as I could, first.
__________________
-A. E. M. Jeff (Eponym)
Magnets - We know how they work!
Reply With Quote
  #36  
Old 08-05-2008, 04:40 PM
Bloggin' Noggin Bloggin' Noggin is offline
 
Join Date: Oct 2006
Posts: 893
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Quote:
Originally Posted by AemJeff View Post
Hi BN, the "non-specialist" reference was just me poking a little fun at myself for suggesting something I thought might be seen as somewhat arrogant.

It may be that my bottom line objection is really to the nomenclature, we'll see. Defining "moral reality" seems to me to imply a universally applicable set of rules to behavior by... is "moral agents" a useful term? I'll use it for the moment. Maybe I assume too much, but in this context "reality" seems to imply a fundamental, fixed basis - e.g. the proposition Slavery is not a moral practice might be considered always true. Or, if that's too simplistic, moral reality could be a set of rules by which we could judge the proposition I used within a given context. Forced to judge both of these options I'd reject the first, unconditionally. I don't believe there can be simple moral propositions about which a fixed truth value could be universally agreed upon. If we allow for meta-propositions (rules for creating true propositions in particular contexts) I'm not as sure of myself. I don't believe such things are possible, but it would require a much subtler argument to rule it out, I think.

I haven't really made my arguments in this post, but I thought I'd state the problem as I see it, as simply as I could, first.
Are you simply saying that the morality of a certain behavior may depend upon the circumstances surrounding the behavior and the motivations and intentions of the agent who produces the behavior? For example, are you just saying that whether or not lying is wrong depends on whether you are lying in order to con someone out of his life savings or in order to save a Tutsi from the Hutu mob? That's just moral common sense, isn't it?

Why should the moral realist be any more committed to the claim that lying is always and everwhere wrong than the temperature-realist is committed to the claim that it is always and everywhere 70 degrees -- both in the Sahara and at the top of Everest?
Reply With Quote
  #37  
Old 08-05-2008, 09:06 PM
AemJeff AemJeff is offline
 
Join Date: Feb 2007
Posts: 7,750
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Quote:
Originally Posted by Bloggin' Noggin View Post
Are you simply saying that the morality of a certain behavior may depend upon the circumstances surrounding the behavior and the motivations and intentions of the agent who produces the behavior? For example, are you just saying that whether or not lying is wrong depends on whether you are lying in order to con someone out of his life savings or in order to save a Tutsi from the Hutu mob? That's just moral common sense, isn't it?

Why should the moral realist be any more committed to the claim that lying is always and everwhere wrong than the temperature-realist is committed to the claim that it is always and everywhere 70 degrees -- both in the Sahara and at the top of Everest?
There are certainly weaker and stronger moral values. The examples you brought up involved lying, but probably weren’t moral acts equivalent to one another. The bad part about lying in a con is the con itself. Compared to that, the lie is incidental. There doesn’t seem to be a lot of “moral capital” at stake in a lie. For other acts, rape and slavery for instance, there’s far less ambiguity. But even in those cases, it’s obviously better to find something other than the act itself as a basis for measurement. We’ve discussed the idea that the degree of harm caused by an act seems like a useful metric. (As a side issue, that definition seems to disconnect this discussion from ideas of religious morality, which seem to come packed with a lot of arbitrary stuff. So even if I were able to convince you, I think there are a lot of people who will never grant the validity of my argument.)

It seems to me that defining “harm” in a useful, consistent way is very difficult. As long as the definition is based on terms derived from our own experiences it’s not too bad. But that isn’t the case if you’re asserting universality. But if you’re going to say that there’s some core set of values that doesn’t change, regardless of context, then your terms shouldn't be framed relative to yourself. Without some reference to all kinds of facts about ourselves: biological, psychological, cultural, how do we derive a consistent definition of an abstraction as broad as “harm?” If I’m right about that, then I don’t see what basis we have for asserting something like “moral reality.”

It’s the claim of universality, the assertion that there’s something in the universe that predated humanity, and which inherently judges one act over another, that I have a hard time with. “Human morality,” feels truer to me than “moral reality.” The effect that distinction has on what I do tomorrow is pretty slight, but seems to me very important to understanding the nature of the thing itself.
__________________
-A. E. M. Jeff (Eponym)
Magnets - We know how they work!

Last edited by AemJeff; 08-05-2008 at 10:05 PM.. Reason: clarity
Reply With Quote
  #38  
Old 08-06-2008, 06:06 PM
Bloggin' Noggin Bloggin' Noggin is offline
 
Join Date: Oct 2006
Posts: 893
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Hi Jeff, I'm taking your post a bit out of order:


Quote:
It’s the claim of universality, the assertion that there’s something in the universe that predated humanity, and which inherently judges one act over another, that I have a hard time with. “Human morality,” feels truer to me than “moral reality.” The effect that distinction has on what I do tomorrow is pretty slight, but seems to me very important to understanding the nature of the thing itself.
I guess you are not actually talking to me, but rather to my distant cousin, Strawman Noggin? I seem to recall saying a few times that the moral realist is not committed to the view that moral truth predates human beings. Of course, I could be wrong about that, but then I think you owe me an argument that it really is necessary after all.
Also you say 'something in the universe that "inherently" judges one act over another' -- normally only conscious beings make judgments. Are you imputing to me a belief, not only in a moral reality that predated humans, but a divine reality?
The essential issue for the (objectivist) moral realist is (I repeat) not, not NOT whether moral reality "predated" human beings. The essential issue is whether or not there are any true moral claims, and if so, if they are the sort of thing that everyone could be wrong about. Frenchmen could all be wrong about the grammar of English, but if all native English speakers think something is grammatical, then their grammatical sense makes it so. Could slavery have been wrong in the antebellum south, even though it was regarded by the majority of southerners as permissible? Questions like THAT are what is relevant to the issue of whether or not moral claims state objective facts. But notice that that question makes ABSOLUTELY NO CLAIMS ABOUT THE AGE OF THE DINOSAURS!!!

Quote:
There are certainly weaker and stronger moral values. The examples you brought up involved lying, but probably weren’t moral acts equivalent to one another. The bad part about lying in a con is the con itself. Compared to that, the lie is incidental.
Well this is incidental to the question of moral realism. But suppose I con you out of your money by promising to pay you back on a loan, when I know perfectly well I won't do it. I'm not clear how you differentiate the lie from "the con itelf". What seems clear is that one can lie for selfish or malevolent reasons or for benevolent reasons. But even if one lies benevolently, it doesn't follow that one isn't wronging the person lied to. Doctors used to lie to their seriously ill patients as a matter of routine -- the motive may have been largely benevolent, but it was certainly also rather short-sighted concerning the harm that might be done by depriving the patient of the chance to make certain important decisions for himself.
Quote:
There doesn’t seem to be a lot of “moral capital” at stake in a lie.
Are you saying that there isn't much wrong with lying? If you think trust is an important part of a society's "social capital", and if lying tends to undermine trust, then there seems to be something wrong with lying (even if it is sometimes hard to identify a single victim who is clearly harmed by a certain lie. So I don't think I agree with you. I'd say every lie has something to be said against it, but there certainly are cases where the evaluative pros outweigh the evaluative cons. (But again this is a question entirely within normative morality.)

For other acts, rape and slavery for instance, there’s far less ambiguity. But even in those cases, it’s obviously better to find something other than the act itself as a basis for measurement. We’ve discussed the idea that the degree of harm caused by an act seems like a useful metric. (As a side issue, that definition seems to disconnect this discussion from ideas of religious morality, which seem to come packed with a lot of arbitrary stuff. So even if I were able to convince you, I think there are a lot of people who will never grant the validity of my argument.)

Quote:
It seems to me that defining “harm” in a useful, consistent way is very difficult. As long as the definition is based on terms derived from our own experiences it’s not too bad. But that isn’t the case if you’re asserting universality. But if you’re going to say that there’s some core set of values that doesn’t change, regardless of context, then your terms shouldn't be framed relative to yourself.
If I understand what you are doing here, I suspect you are committing a fallacy we might call "the fallacy of hyperspecificity". I am a realist about bald men -- I think there are bald men, and there's a fact of the matter about whether Kojack was bald. But I am not able to divide men sharply into the bald class and the non-bald class -- there are going to be tough cases. There may also be unforeseen and unforeseable cases (aliens whose hair only ever grows around the bottom of the head). Does it follow that Kojack wasn't bald?
If I torture a small child to death because it helps me pass a boring afternoon, that's wrong -- and we can know it's wrong even though we don't know much about aliens and even though there are cases where it's much harder to balance the harms and benefits being balanced in this case.

It might be very hard to know what harms aliens -- or how to balance harms to aliens vs. harms to us -- but I don't see how that makes it hard to balance my relief from mild boredom against the tremendous pain inflicted on the (human) child in my example

The moral realist claims that there are some moral truths, that these truths could be true even if people didn't believe them and that most of our paradigm cases of moral truth probably really are true. This does NOT commit him to saying that, when faced with any situation, no matter how difficult, he can tell you the morally correct answer.

Quote:
Without some reference to all kinds of facts about ourselves: biological, psychological, cultural, how do we derive a consistent definition of an abstraction as broad as “harm?”
Why do we need a definition -- or anyway, why does the definition have to be more specific than "adversely affect" -- so specific that it can tell us whether we are harming aliens we've never met before? Suppose we've got the moral principle "do no harm". We run across an alien species which we think we are treating very kindly. But it turns out that all our attempts to be nice are actually causing them excruciating pain, which they express with (what look to us like contented smiles). Should we really expect our moral principle or our definition of "harm" to tell us all about this kind of alien that expresses pain in this way? Of course, not! As we learn more about the creatures, we can learn better what harms them and what helps them, and thereby we can learn better how to treat them morally.
In fact, it seems to me that this accounts for a good deal of the moral learning we go through as individuals and as a society, even though we haven't faced any aliens yet. We start off with very rigid and self-referential ideas that what pleases US is good and what we don't like is bad, and we assume that there is something wrong with people who want something other than what we want. Moral growth is precisely a growth in the ability to grasp other points of view, to see that there may be nothing wrong with Fred being attracted to James, even though James isn't your cup of tea.
Reply With Quote
  #39  
Old 08-06-2008, 11:41 PM
AemJeff AemJeff is offline
 
Join Date: Feb 2007
Posts: 7,750
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

BN, as I’ve said, the phrase “moral reality” seems to me to imply something stable and unchanging. Maybe it doesn’t. Part of what I’m trying to do here is engage on that idea. I floated the alternative term “human morality” to describe what I think you’re talking about in my previous post. “Reality,” in the metaphorical sense used here, describes something which doesn’t react to context, it is the context. I’m open to the suggestion that my interpretation is wrong, but it is what I believe. I heard you when you said you didn’t believe it: I just don’t understand the justification, and I think the distinction is important. Speaking of metaphors, I’m not likely to float a deist argument – when I talk about the “universe judging” what I have in mind is the idea that an observer would have an unchanging basis for judgment regardless of context.

The other half of my argument is that the terms useful in discussing morality are sensitive to context. I don’t think I’m overspecifying a meaning for “harm,” for example. On the contrary, I thought you might accuse me of using a definition so vague that I was ducking the question in exactly the opposite direction! The idea of “slavery” only makes sense in the context of certain economic assumptions. Without those assumptions what we recognize as slavery might be seen in completely different way. The point isn’t that reasonable people can disagree. It’s that our definitions are based on parochial views. We haven’t encountered Martians, or the Borg, or intelligent goats, and there are few human societies extant that are deeply disconnected from the larger world. I’d argue that that’s a lack of data, a limitation of experience, not a limit on how abstract the underlying rules of morality might be.

Quote:
The essential issue is whether or not there are any true moral claims, and if so, if they are the sort of thing that everyone could be wrong about. Frenchmen could all be wrong about the grammar of English, but if all native English speakers think something is grammatical, then their grammatical sense makes it so.
This is exactly what I mean. English grammar is not “lingual reality.” English is a formal system – it has its own set of rules, and is roughly equivalent to a bunch of other more or less related systems each of which has its own set of atoms and rules. I’m arguing that our view of morality is just such a formal system, with its own set of rules arrived at, organically perhaps, but arbitrary and accidental, and based on facts about us that happen to be true, but that are inherent only to us, and weren’t inevitable. And getting back to where I started here, that seems to me to be the opposite of what’s implied by the term “moral reality.”
__________________
-A. E. M. Jeff (Eponym)
Magnets - We know how they work!

Last edited by AemJeff; 08-07-2008 at 12:36 AM.. Reason: clarity
Reply With Quote
  #40  
Old 08-07-2008, 08:38 PM
Bloggin' Noggin Bloggin' Noggin is offline
 
Join Date: Oct 2006
Posts: 893
Default Re: Sentimental Mood Edition

Quote:
Originally Posted by AemJeff View Post
BN, as I’ve said, the phrase “moral reality” seems to me to imply something stable and unchanging. Maybe it doesn’t.
Seems to you perhaps, but I don't see that at all. How would you argue for this implication?
Does the term "physical reality" imply that the universe is "stable and unchanging?" Since the world is actually constantly changing, does it follow that there is no physical reality whatsoever? Reality is opposed to "appearance" and "what we think", not to change. Catastrophists and gradualists in geology both argue over what reality is (really) like -- catastrophists are not arguing that there's no reality only dreams and illusions. No, they are arguing that reality changes more catastrophically than some people THINK.

Quote:
Part of what I’m trying to do here is engage on that idea. I floated the alternative term “human morality” to describe what I think you’re talking about in my previous post. “Reality,” in the metaphorical sense used here, describes something which doesn’t react to context, it is the context.
I’m open to the suggestion that my interpretation is wrong, but it is what I believe. I heard you when you said you didn’t believe it: I just don’t understand the justification, and I think the distinction is important.
All right, you want to use the word "reality" in a certain way -- fine, but let's recognize that the power of stipulation is not a very significant power. I'll let you make "reality" mean whatever you like, but you can't simply define my position out of existence.

Maybe we can start by getting clear on a single distinction:

Let moral objectivism be the view that there are true moral claims, and it is quite possible that everyone could be wrong about these claims. For example, slavery (as known in ancient Athens, for instance) has at times been universally regarded as right, but an objectivist maintains that that the mere fact that everyone agreed it was right doesn't mean it was right at that time.
Moral relativism (or conventionalism) on the other hand maintains that if I and my society all agree that something is right -- then we thereby make it right (for us). Just as it doesn't make sense to wonder whether all English speakers might be wrong about whether double negatives are grammatical in English, it just doesn't even make sense to wonder whether slavery is morally right in our society.

I take the objectivist view. You take the relativist view, apparently.

Let's distinguish THAT opposition from a quite different contrast:
Circumstance absolutism: Moral principles must make not vary given the circumstances. If lying is wrong in one case, it must be always wrong. If killing is OK in self-defense, then it must be right when you do it to get somebody else's Red Sox tickets.

Circumstance dependency: Moral principles (if they are any good) must vary given the circumstances -- killing in self-defense may be justified while killing for more frivolous reasons is not.

AS I said, circumstance dependency is not the same as moral relativism and moral absolutism is not the same as moral objectivism. And if you doubt me, I'll show you.
First of all, the moral relativist says that we can't all be wrong about morality. So, if we all believed in absolutist moral principles (i.e., ones that don't take circumstances into account) we couldn't all be wrong. If we all believed that killing was always wrong, then absolutism (with respect to this principle anyway) would be true -- not DESPITE relativism, but BECAUSE of relativism. A relativist can be both a circumstance absolutist and believe that moral truth is relative to what one believes. Nothing contradictory about that.

On the other hand, a moral absolutist can be a believer in circumstance dependency (I am a living, breathing example of someone who holds both beliefs). If we all believed that killing was always wrong, we would be all be mistaken on my view. And if we all believed that killing was always right, we would also be mistaken on my view. In my view, the objectively true moral principles are ones that make the morality of killing or lying dependent upon circumstances.

Let me stop there and see whether you see what I am saying and agree with me.
Reply With Quote
 


Currently Active Users Viewing This Thread: 1 (0 members and 1 guests)
 
Thread Tools
Display Modes

Posting Rules
You may not post new threads
You may not post replies
You may not post attachments
You may not edit your posts

BB code is On
Smilies are On
[IMG] code is On
HTML code is Off

Forum Jump


All times are GMT -4. The time now is 11:32 AM.


Powered by vBulletin® Version 3.8.7 Beta 1
Copyright ©2000 - 2020, vBulletin Solutions, Inc.