But who says a “definition” must satisfy a) and b)? Why can’t a policy position or an operative philosophic premise satisfy a) and b) and, in doing so, justify a book-length thesis? For example, the fact that the modern “left” advocates government control over the means of production without government ownership of those means (which is to say, the “left” advocates a system whereby the government reaps the benefits of property without the accepting the concomitant responsibilities of property) certainly satisfies a) and b). But what has this to do with devising a “definition”? Who besides you brought that rule to the game?
Look. I think I get it. You suppose that the book is primarily about labels. The interview failed to convince you otherwise, as did excerpts from the book. Furthermore, such excerpts as you encountered were preposterous, contradictory or trivial to such a degree that no book could possibly redeem them. I get it.
For my part, I do not think the excerpts you quote are, on their face, preposterous, contradictory or trivial. So what now? We can’t debate the substance of those excerpts, because your position is that there is no substance to debate. Besides, I am obviously as unserious as Goldberg. My views are, as you generously put it, “inane.”
Funny how different we are. I’ll go ahead and read an unserious book before I take the time and trouble to write blog entries about it. As a student of Discourse Ethics, I offer the tentative observation that your statements and actions don’t readily reconcile.
Next up on my nightstand, after Liberal Fascism, is The History of Sexuality (Foucault). Talk about unserious.