Sorry. By "seventy-five minute interview," I thought you meant the interview, not the book. (Your clarification is sort of silly in any case. Insofar as you've professed a disinclination to read the book, all you're left with are excerptions and distillations, such as this interview. Why take pains to claim that you’re commenting on the book rather than the interview?)
The final sentence of your post is an exercise in circularity. If it could be established a priori that the thesis is “ludicrous” then of course you’re under no intellectual obligation to investigate further by reading the book. But that’s precisely the point at issue, isn’t it?
I think this debate is very complex, especially insofar as it touches upon the philosophy of language. Questions of referent relations arise. Review this sequence of postings and you’ll find existential arguments and linguistic arguments mixed and matched with scant regard for the difference. Are we talking about mere labels here? Or historic data? What is the relationship between the two? Where is the divide?
If I’m reading you right, you seem to believe that Goldberg’s thesis (i.e., American liberalism is fascistic in its pedigree) falls within the realm of analytic propositions and, therefore, runs counter to a tautological truth (i.e., liberalism is not fascism). For my part, I believe that Goldberg’s thesis falls within the realm of synthetic propositions and is, therefore, an empirical question anterior to any trafficking in labels. From this vantage, it makes no sense to claim that you’ve sized up the book on the basis of its dust jacket. Empirical questions are not adjudicated a priori.